Uniform Commercial Code by Payne, Kathleen E.
Michigan State University College of Law
Digital Commons at Michigan State University College of Law
Faculty Publications
1-1-1983
Uniform Commercial Code
Kathleen E. Payne
Michigan State University College of Law, payneka@law.msu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.msu.edu/facpubs
Part of the Commercial Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons at Michigan State University College of Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons at Michigan State University College of Law. For more
information, please contact domannbr@law.msu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kathleen E. Payne, Uniform Commercial Code, 1983 Det. C.L. Rev. 575 (1983).
HeinOnline -- 1983 Det. C.L. Rev. 575 1983
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 
Kathleen E. Paynet 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Three Uniform Commercial Code Article 2 and two Article 9 is-
sues are presented by the commercial transaction cases decided 
during the survey period between October 1, 1981 to October 1, 
1982. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the frequently 
litigated and troublesome issues of what constitutes timely and ad-
equate notice of breach, whether reliance is a necessary element in 
a breach of express warranty action, and the effect of the implied 
good faith term in a contract containing a termination at will 
clause. In the personal property security arena, the cases presented 
the questions of resolving priorities between conflicting purchase 
money secured parties and of applying U.C.C. section 9-103 to de-
termine the validity of a perfected out-of-state security interest. 
The Article 2 cases were decided as diversity cases since the Uni-
form Commercial Code provisions have not been enacted by the 
United States Congress as general federal statutory law. Accord-
ingly, in interpreting and applying Code language, the federal 
court first looks to the appropriate state law. Only in the absence 
of guidance from the forum state's highest court or its state legisla-
ture is the federal court charged to decide unsettled issues of state 
law by analyzing the indications and determining the path the 
state court would follow. 
II. SALES 
A. Notice of Breach 
The vexatious and frequently litigated question of what consti-
tutes timely and sufficient notice of breach to preserve the buyer's 
remedies against the seller under U.C.C. section 2-607 (3)(a) is 
presented by the case of K & M Joint Venture v. Smith Interna-
tional, Inc! The standard enunciated in K & M Joint Venture is 
t J.D., Detroit College of Law, 1977; L.L.M., University of Michigan, 1981; Associate Pro-
fessor of Law, Detroit College of Law. The author gratefully acknowledges the research as-
sistance of Laura L. Ritzman. 
1. 669 F.2d 1106 (6th Cir. 1982). 
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significant for two reasons. First, the standard has been quoted ap-
provingly and applied by a different Sixth Circuit panel in a per 
curiam opinion, summarily affirming a summary judgment dismis-
sal entered by the district court.! Second, and more importantly, it 
may be interpreted as establishing a stricter standard for notifica-
tion of breach and assertion of legal rights to satisfy V.C.C. section 
2-607 than was adopted by the well received Fifth Circuit case3 
upon which K & M Joint Venture is based. 
In this case, plaintiff, K & M Joint Venture (K & M), purchased 
a twelve foot diameter tunnel boring machine (TBM) from the 
Calweld Division of defendant, Smith International, Inc. (Calweld). 
The TBM was to be sued for a sewer project in Cleveland. It is 
undisputed that the TBM malfunctioned repeatedly from June 25, 
1974, the date upon which the machine was first used on the sewer 
project, until it was removed for extensive repair on January 8, 
1975. During this period, K & M was in frequent contact with de-
fendant, seeking advice and voicing complaints. On one such occa-
sion in July, K & M expressed an intention to hold Calweld re-
sponsible for the breakdown. On January 23, 1975, K & M advised 
Calweld that it planned to completely rebuild the TBM and re-
quested a full set of drawings. During the rebuilding,· K & M dis-
covered a number of discrepancies between the drawings and the 
actual construction of the TBM. Eleven months later, plaintiff 
filed an action for breach of warranty. 
The Vnited States District Court for the Northern District of 
Ohio, in a bench trial, awarded damages of approximately 1.5 mil-
lion dollars.· The district court found that the seller had breached 
the implied warranty of merchantibility under V.C.C. section 2-
314, since the machine was so defective that it required complete 
rebuilding.6 
Defendant appealed from this decision, raising two issues. First, 
2. Running Spring Associates v. Masonite Corp., 680 F.2d 469 (6th Cir. 1982). The sum-
mary judgment was based upon the plaintiff-buyer's failure to establish the requisite timely 
and sufficient notice of breach required by Ohio Revised Code § 1302.65(c), which is the 
Ohio legislature's enactment of Uniform Commercial Code § 2-607(3)(a). The facts are not 
set forth in the per curiam opinion, accordingly, this author does not know what notice, if 
any, was given by the buyer. 
3. Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 532 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1976). 
4. 669 F.2d at n08. 
5. [d. at 1108-09. 
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that the TBM was sold without warranties and, second, that plain-
tiff failed to timely notify the defendant of the breach of warranty. 
This second issue and its resolution may prove troublesome to 
practitioners in the future. 
With regard to the first issue, defendant contended that the 
TBM was sold "as is," and that use of this language was intended 
to exclude all implied warranties under the Uniform Commercial 
Code. The district court, however, found that the seller's use of the 
term "as is" simply meant that Calweld was unwilling to incur fur-
ther selling expenses, such as cleaning up the accessories or includ-
ing additional parts.6 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed 
as to this issue. 
The court noted that, while the language "as is" can be used to 
disclaim implied warranties, including the implied warranty of 
merchantability, such language does not exclude these warranties 
automatically. In support, the court cited U.C.C. section 2-316 
(3)(a), which states in relevant part: "Unless the circumstances in-
dicate otherwise," all implied warranties are excluded by expres-
sions like 'as is,' 'with all faults' or other language which in com-
mon understanding calls the buyer's attention to the exclusion of 
warranties and makes plain that there is no implied warranty. "7 
The court then found that the district court did not err in deter-
mining that, in this case, the "circumstances indicated otherwise," 
that is, that the use of "as is" was not intended to exclude the 
implied warranties. 
Calweld next contended that the district court erred in finding 
that the plaintiff notified defendant of the breach within a reason-
able time. Plaintiff argued that notice is a question of fact and that 
the district court's finding that K & M gave adequate and timely 
notice was not clearly erroneous. The Sixth Circuit disagreed and 
reversed on this issue. The court stated that whether notice was 
given, and of what it consisted, were questions of fact but the 
question of whether the notice satisfied the statutory requirement 
was one of law.8 Thus, the court held that notice under U.C.C. sec-
tion 2-607 (3)(a) is a mixed question of fact and law. As such, the 
6. Id. at 1109. 
7. Id. at 1110. 
8. Id. at 1111. 
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reviewing court is not bound by the clearly erroneous standard.9 
The court found that the district court erred, in regarding as 
controlling the sentence from comment 4 to U.C.C. section 2-607 
which states that "[t]he content of the notification need merely in-
dicate to the seller that the transaction is still troublesome and 
must be watched." Following language set forth in the Fifth Cir-
cuit case of Eastern Airlines v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,10 the 
Sixth Circuit panel held that merely indicating that a transaction 
is troublesome is not sufficient to constitute notice. Underpinning 
U.C.C. section 2-607 is a requirement of commercial good faith 
which is met by prompt notice that the transaction is claimed to 
involve a breach. In finding that K & M did not, as a matter of 
law, timely notify the defendant, the court stated that K & M did 
not give actual notice of breach until the cause of action was filed 
some seventeen months after the first problems were experienced 
with the TBM.11 
Judge Holschuh dissented, stating that deference should have 
been given to the district court's determination of the timeliness 
and adequacy of notice.llI The dissent noted that whether proper 
notice has been given has been treated as a question of fact in nu-
merous decisions, including Standard Alliance v. Black Clawson,13 
a 1978 Sixth Circuit case. The dissent then conceded that the 
question could be viewed as a mixed one of fact and law, as it in-
9. The majority opinion backs away from this mixed question of fact and law standard 
in a footnote addressed to the dissent: 
The dissent is concerned that we have not dealt properly with the findings of the 
district court on the issue of the adequacy and timeliness of notice. After careful 
examination of the record on appeal, the majority concludes that even if the find-
ings with respect to notice were purely factual, it would be necssary to reverse 
them under the "clearly enoneous" standard of Rule 52 (a). 
Id. at 1112. This footnote may provide a future loophole to the Sixth Circuit for accomodat-
ing the inconsistent positions of the instant case and the case of Standard Alliance v. Black 
Clawson Co., 587 F.2d 813 (6th Cir. 1978), which held that "[wJhether proper notice was 
given was a question of fact." 587 F.2d at 823. 
10. 532 F.2d at 757. The instant case is a diversity action involving an Ohio buyer and a 
California seller contractually bound by a term requiring that contract provisions be con-
strued in accordance with California law. In the Eastern Airlines case, the Fifth Circuit was 
required to and did apply California law in interpreting the notice requirements of U.C.C. § 
2-607. Thus, the Sixth Circuit panel's reliance on the Eastern Airlines case was appropri-
ately placed. 
11. 669 F.2d at 1114-15. 
12. Id. at 1116 (J. Holschuh, dissenting). 
13. 587 F.2d at 813. 
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volved application of a legal standard, and therefore the court is 
not bound by the clearly erroneous rule. If, as in this case, how-
ever, a district court judge applies a correct legal standard and his 
conclusion is supported by substantial evidence in the record and 
is not unreasonable, then the decision should be affirmed.14 
The dissent indicated that there was no disagreement among the 
panel members as to the interpretation of the notice provision of 
V.C.C. section 2-607. The dissenting judge agreed that V.C.C. sec-
tion 2-607 requires more than notifying the seller that the transac-
tion is troublesome. The majority and dissent part company in an-
swering whether the district judge accepted the sentence 
previously quoted from comment 4 as controlling. The dissent ar-
gued that the district court did not rely upon limited comment 
language and, therefore, did not apply an erroneous legal standard. 
To the contrary, the dissent emphasized that the district court 
correctly discussed all of the purposes underlying the notice re-
quirement and evaluated the plaintiff's conduct when taken as a 
whole as constituting adequate notice of breach. Iii The district 
court viewed the facts differently from the majority, finding that 
the plaintiff continually complained to the defendant about 
problems with the TBM. According to the dissent, the district 
court found the requisite notice of breach in a K & M statement to 
Calweld's service representative, less than one month after the first 
installation of the TBM, that K & M intended to hold Calweld 
14. 669 F.2d at 1119. In so concluding, the dissent stated that giving deference to a trial 
court's application of a correct legal standard recognizes that the lower court is in a better 
position to make evidentiary findings based upon the record presented. Such recognition 
preserves the proper relationship between trial courts and appellate courts. The dissent 
went on to quote from Ashland Oil and Refining Co. v. Kenny Construction Co., 395 F.2d 
683 (6th Cir. 1968), in which the court approved a standard of review of a "mixed finding" 
that gives deference to the lower court's conclusions: 
If (the court's determination is] regarded as a mixed finding, the application of 
legal principles was involved in making the determination, and it is therefore sub-
ject to review free from the clearly erroneous rule. See Taft Broadcasting Co. v. 
Columbus· Dayton Local, 297 F.2d 149 (6th Cir. 1961); Cordovan Associates, Inc. v. 
Dayton Rubber Co., 290 F.2d 858 (6th Cir. 1961). Plaintiff does not contend, nor 
do we find, that the District Court applied an incorrect principle of law to the 
fact, and while that court's determination is not the only one permissible under 
the facts, it is supported by substantial evidence and is not unreasonable. Ac-
cordingly, the judgement of the District Court should be affirmed. 
669 F.2d at 1119 (quoting Ashland Oil, 395 F.2d at 684). 
15. 669 F.2d at 1121. 
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responsible for the breakdowns.18 The distinction between the dis-
trict court and Sixth Circuit decisions is the weight given to this 
early statement in informing Calweld of the breach. The problem 
thus posed by this case for the practitioner is what constitutes 
timely and reasonable notice from both a counseling and litigation 
standpoint. 
A buyer, who seeks recovery from a seller for a claimed breach of 
warranty, must give the seller prompt notice of his claim. U.C.C. 
section 2-607 (3)(a) provides that "(3) [w]here a tender has been 
accepted (a) the buyer must within a reasonable time after he dis-
covers or should have discovered any breach notify the seller of 
breach or be barred from any remedy." Moreover, inasmuch as sec-
tion 2-607 operates as a condition precedent to any recovery, the 
plaintiff bears the burden of proof to show not only that notice was 
given within a reasonable time,17 but also, that the notice was ade-
quate to inform the defendant he was in breach. 
What constitutes a reasonable time within which the buyer 
should have discovered any breach and notified the seller is a fre-
quently litigated question. The cases certainly do not provide a 
workable rule or formula. For example, notice after two month has 
been held unreasonablel8 while notice after two and one-half years 
has been held timely. 19 
Thus, while case law is not helpful in evaluating timeliness, one 
of the policies underlying the notice requirement is particularly 
helpful in predicting how a court· may apply the reasonable time 
requirement. so A major reason for requiring notice is that it opens 
the way for normal settlement through negotiations, providing an 
opportunity for the seller to suggest cure and for the buyer to min-
16. [d. at 1122. 
17. Standard Alliance, 587 F.2d at 823, citing Ehlers v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 226 
N.W.2d 157, 159 (S.D. 1975); Schnabl v. Ford Motor Co., 54 Wis. 2d 354, 198 N.W.2d 161 
(1972). 
18. Hays Merchandise, Inc. v. Dewey, 78 Wash. 2d 343, 474 P.2d 270 (1970). 
19. Lewis v. Mobil Oil Corp., 438 F.2d 500, 508-09 (8th Cir. 1971). 
20. Treatise authors White and Summers indicate that two other policies behind U.C.C. 
§ 2-607 can be identified. The second policy is to afford the seller the opportunity to prepare 
for negotiation and litigation. The third and least important policy "is to give the defendant 
that same kind of mind balm he gets from the statute of limitations. There is some value in 
allowing a seller, at some point, to close his books on goods sold in the past and to pass on 
to other things." J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM 
COMMERCIAL CODE 422 (1980). 
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imize losses.21 Accordingly, where a buyer is held to have forfeited 
Code remedies by failing to give timely notice, the court has gener-
ally found bad faith on the part of the buyer. This commercial bad 
faith is found in the buyer's failure to give seller an opportunity to 
cure the breach. 
Timeliness, therefore, may depend completely upon whether the 
passage of time increases the damages incurred and whether the 
seller, with notice of the breach, could have reduced the damages 
through an opportunity to cure by adjustment or replacement. Ap-
plying this standard to K & M Joint Venture, the notice given to 
Calweld's service representative within one month from first use 
appears timely; however, the notice given by filing suit seventeen 
months after the first problems were experienced appears inconsis-
tent with the underlying policy considerations and, therefore, 
untimely. 
The more difficult question posed by the instant case is deter-
mining what constitutes sufficient notice under U.C.C. section 2-
607. There is a split of authority as to what constitutes adequate 
notice. The statutory language merely requires that the buyer "no-
tify the seller of breach or be barred from any remedy."22 No stan-
dard of adequacy of notice is provided. Thus, to delineate a stan-
dard, courts and commentators have relied upon the official 
comments accompanying the Code provision. Comment 4 to U.C.C. 
section 2-607 provides in pertinent part: 
The content of the notification need merely be sufficient to let the seller 
know that the transaction is still troublesome and must be watched. 
There is no reason to require that the notification which saves the 
buyer's rights under this section must include a clear statement of all the 
objections that will be relied on by the buyer, as under the section cover-
ing statements of defect upon rejection (§2-605). Nor is there reason for 
requiring the notification to be a claim for damages or of any threatened 
litigation or other resort to a remedy. The notification which saves the 
buyer's rights under this article need only be such as informs the seller 
that the transaction is claimed to involve a breach, and thus opens the 
way for normal settlement through negotiation. 
The problem presented is whether the Code drafters intended 
U.C.C. section 2-607 to eliminate the technical notice requirements 
of its predecessor, section 49 of the Uniform Sales Act. Under sec-
21. [d. at 421. 
22. U.C.C. § 2-607(3)(a) (1978). 
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tion 49, it was irrelevant whether a seller had actual knowledge of 
a non-conforming tender. Instead, the critical question was 
whether the seller had been informed that the buyer considered 
the seller to be in breach. In a pre-Code case, therefore, applying 
the Uniform Sales Act provision, Judge Learned Hand presented 
the following standard which was subsequently quoted as authori-
tative on section 49: 
The plaintiff replies that the buyer is not required to give notice of what 
the seller already knows, but this confuses two quite different things. 
The notice "of the breach" required is not of the facts, which the seller 
presumably knows quite as well as, if not better than, the buyer, but of 
buyer's claim that they constitute a breach. The purpose of the notice is 
to advise the seller that he must meet a claim for damages, as to which, 
rightly or wrongly, the law requires that he shall have early warning.28 
The notice standard developed under section 49 required that the 
buyer make a specific claim for damages. Moreover, some jurisdic-
tions required the buyer to specify, in detail, the basis of his claim 
that the contract was breached. U 
Clearly, some of the technical requirements of section 49 are dis-
pensed with under the Code provision. As noted in the Code com-
ments, "[t]here is no reason to require that the notification which· 
saves the buyer's rights under this section must include a clear 
statement of all the objections."u Further, the drafters intended to 
eliminate the technical requirement of a specific claim for dam-
ages, stating that "[n]or is there reason for requiring the notifica-
tion to be a claim for damages or of any threatened litigation or 
other resort to a remedy."1I8 
Relying on certain portions of Code comment 4, some courts and 
commentators adopted the view that almost any kind of notice of 
dissatisfaction is sufficient.17 Clearly the drafters intended a loose 
test; a scribbled note on a bit of toilet paper will do. lIS Nor is a 
scribbled note required. The law seems well established that oral 
23. American Mfg. Co. v. United States Shipping Board E. F. Corp., 7 F.2d 565, 566 (2d 
Cir. 1925). 
24. See, e.g., Idzykowski v. Jordon Marsh Co., 279 Mass. 163, 181 N.E. 172, 173 (1932). 
25. U.C.C. § 2-607 comment 4 (1978). 
26. [d. 
27. See, e.g., Lewis v. Mobil Oil Corp., 438 F.2d 500, 509 (8th Cir. 1971); Metro Invest-
ment Corp. v. Portland Rd. Lumber Yard, Inc., 263 Ore. 76, 501 P.2d 312 (1972). 
28. See supra note 20, at 425. 
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notification satisfies the notice requirement.29 Some courts have in-
dicated that certain events, such as the seller's representatives 
viewing the product's inability to properly function,30 are sufficient 
to constitute notice to the seller. 
Other courts, however, require something more than the minimal 
notification endorsed by the authorities cited above. The focal 
point of jurisdictions requiring a more stringent standard appears 
generally to be the final sentence in Code comment 4 to U.C.C. 
section 2-607: "The notification ... need only be such as informs 
the seller that the transaction is claimed to involve a breach, and 
thus opens the way for normal settlement through negotiation." 
The notice must inform the seller that the buyer regards the con-
tract as breached. Courts interpret this as conforming with the 
standard established by Judge Learned Hand in 1925 and, thus, 
indirectly engraft back the flavor of Uniform Sales Act section 49. 
Eastern Airlines,3l heavily relied upon in K & M Joint Venture, is 
such a case. 
Eastern Airlines involved a series of contracts by which McDon-
nell Douglas32 agreed to manufacture and sell to Eastern ninety-
nine jet planes for approximately one-half billion dollars. Although 
varying in details, all the agreements required McDonnell Douglas 
to manufacture planes at a stipulated price per aircraft, with each 
jet designated for delivery during a particular calendar month. 
Throughout the duration of the contracts, Eastern Airlines en-
countered delivery delay problems. Several months after the final 
delivery, Eastern wrote McDonnell Douglas, presenting a claim for 
damages resulting from the late deliveries which occurred over the 
previous three years.33 The airline alleged that the delays could not 
29. See, e.g., Page v. Camper City & Mobile Home Sales, 292 Ala. 562, 297 So.2d 810 
(1974); Jay v. Zimmerman Co., 327 F. Supp. 1198 (E.D; Mo. 1971); VLN Corp. v. American 
Office Equipment Co., 536 P.2d 863 (Colo. App. 1975); Smith v. Butler, 19 Md. App. 467, 
311 A.2d 813 (1973); Oregon Lumber Co. v. Dwyer Overseas Timber Products Co., 280 Or. 
437, 571 P.2d 884 (1973). 
30. See, e.g., Boeing Airplane Co. v. O'Malley, 329 F.2d 585 (8th Cir. 1964). 
31. See supra note 10 and accompanying text .. 
32. Eastern originally contracted with Douglas Aircraft, Inc., however, during the per-
formance of the contracts, Douglas faced a financial crisis requiring merger with a solvent 
partner. McDonnell Aircraft Company was selected. After McDonnell infused over sixty-
eight million dollars in new funds into Douglas, a merger was consummated, and the new 
McDonnell-Douglas Corporation assumed all the obligations and liabilities of the former 
Douglas Aircraft Company. 
33. 532 F.2d at 964. On the average, each of the ninety late planes was delivered eighty 
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be deemed excusable under the applicable clause in the agree-
ments. McDonnell Douglas rejected the claim and suit resulted. A 
jury awarded Eastern damages of approximately 25 million dollars 
and McDonnell Douglas appealed. 
McDonnell Douglas contended, inter alia, that Eastern had 
failed to give timely and adequate notice of the breaches. The dis-
trict court ruled against McDonnell Douglas on this issue, holding 
that Eastern need not prove, as a predicate for recovery, that it 
had given McDonnell Douglas reasonable and timely notice of 
breach caused by the delivery delays.34 The trial court found the 
notice requirement of V.C.C. section 2-607 inapplicable to delivery 
days because the seller necessarily has knowledge of this type of 
contract violation. Notice serves no purpose and, accordingly, is 
unnecessary where a breach is apparent to both parties.311 
The Fifth Circuit found error and reversed, ruling that the ques-
tion of timely and adequate notice under V.C.C. section 2-607 
should have been submitted to the jury.3S Given the desirable pur-
poses of encouraging compromise and promoting good faith in 
commercial relations, it is not enough under V.C.C. section 2-607 
that a seller has knowledge of the facts constituting a non-con-
forming tender; seller must also be informed that buyer considers 
seller to be in breach of the contract. The V.C.C. notice require-
ment is applicable to delivery delays as well as other breaches, 
thus, the trial court erred in failing to apply the Code provision.37 
Alternatively, the trial court ruled that Eastern's notice was both 
sufficient and timely as a matter of law. The Fifth Circuit stated 
that the adequacy and timeliness of notice typically depends upon 
the reasonableness of the buyer's efforts to communicate his dis-
satisfaction. Thus, the question is particularly within the province 
of the jury. 38 
The court then discussed Eastern's purported notices.39 None of 
the purported notices mentioned the word "breach." There was 
days after the month specified in the contract for delivery, for an alleged grand total of 
7,426 days late. 
34. Id. at 970. 
35. Id. at 970-71. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. at 973. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. 
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also evidence that Eastern publicly praised McDonnell Douglas' 
performance, which created a question of commercial good faith. 
Under the circumstances, Eastern may well have led McDonnell 
Douglas to believe that it was not in breach. Although adequate 
notice may have been given by Eastern in an early letter, the court 
was concerned that subsequent actions by Eastern, including posi-
tive public statements and the negotiation of new contracts with 
the breaching seller, may have dissipated the notice's effect. Ac-
cordingly, the court held that the issue of notice should have been 
submitted to the jury to determine whether Eastern's conduct, 
taken as a whole, constituted adequate and timely notification to 
McDonnell Douglas that it was considered to be in breach.40 
Relying on the Eastern Airlines case, the Sixth Circuit in K & M 
Joint Venture found the buyer's conduct in continuing to order 
and to pay for repair and replacement parts from Calweld, without 
protest, while experiencing problems, as inconsistent with K & M's 
claims that Calweld was liable.41 This "inconsistent behavior" 
standard, discussed in Eastern Airlines, is troublesome when ap-
plied in K & M Joint Venture because of the differences between 
the cases. In Eastern Airlines, the inconsistent behavior of the 
buyer is raised merely as justification for reversal on the basis that 
the issue of no notice was a question of fact. The court found that 
the adequacy or inadequacy of the notice could not be determined 
as a question of law; the conflicting evidence created a question for 
the trier of fact. In K & M Joint Venture, the trier of fact, the 
district court judge, weighed the conflicting evidence, the claimed 
inconsistent behavior of the buyer, and found the notice to be ade-
quate. According to the trier of fact, K & M's conduct subsequent 
to giving notice did not dissipate the effect of the notice. The re-
versal in K & M Joint Venture can only be justified on the basis 
that there was no support in the record for the trier of fact's con-
clusion. The dissent found the trier of fact's ultimate finding to be 
supported by substantial evidence and not unreasonable, although 
alternative findings would have been permissible under the facts. 
Not having access to the record, this reviewer cannot side with 
the majority or the dissent. What is of concern, however, is certain 
language used in the majority opinion which, at least in flavor, es-
40. [d. at 979-80. 
41. 669 F.2d at 1114. 
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tablishes a more stringent standard for notice than contemplated 
by the Eastern Airlines court. The K & M Joint Venture majority 
appeared unnecessarily concerned with the fact that K & M never 
followed up its complaints with any written notice or any state-
ment to an officer of Calweld, although a service representative 
had been informed that K & M intended to hold Calweld responsi-
ble for the breakdowns.4S Further, the Court, in deciding K & M 
Joint Venture, stressed that the only written communication from 
K & M during the entire period was the request for a complete set 
of drawings to rebuild the TBM.48 It would appear that the Sixth 
Circuit is requiring notice akin to actual notice of a breach of war-
ranty or an outright assertion of legal rights, that is, notice more 
appropriate under the Uniform Sales Act provision. 
Such a stringent standard for notice is not contemplated in the 
Eastern Airlines case. On the contrary, there is no requirement 
that notice of breach be of a specific type or employ specific lan-
guage. Notice may be oral; it may be given in a single communica-
tion or derived from several. Notice need not be a specific claim for 
damages or an assertion of legal rights.44 
Although the K & M Joint Venture majority correctly states the 
Eastern Airlines standard, the opinion of the court appears to re-
quire more. At one point, the court apears to require that K & M 
had to bill Calweld for the repairs or claim the right to offset its 
expenses against Calweld's charges for repair and replacement 
parts in order to give adequate notice of breach.n Such a require-
ment is tantamount to requiring the buyer to give notice of a claim 
for damages or to resort to a remedy. The Code comment expressly 
states that such notice is not necessary. The court, while probably 
arriving at a correct decision, appears to go beyond the intent of 
the Code drafters by creating an inflexible notice standard. 
From a counseling standpoint, practitioners should advise clients 
42. [d. 
43. [d. 
44. T.J. Stevenson & Co., Inc. v. 81,193 Bags of Flour, 629 F.2d 338, 359 (5th Cir. 1980), 
adopting and referring to the standard set forth in the Eastern Airlines case. The Fifth 
Circuit upheld the adequate notice finding of the trier of fact in the Stevenson case. [d. at 
364. 
45. 669 F.2d at 1115. The Court stated that "the fact that K & M continued to order 
repair and replacement parts from Calweld and to pay for them as billed without protest 
throughout the period when problems were being experienced is inconsistent with the claim 
that K & M considered Calweld liable." [d. 
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to give written notice of breach of warranty immediately upon dis-
covery. Although not required by the statute, such notice could not 
be held to be inadequate under any standard and serves an impor-
tant evidentiary purpose. The problem, however, is that real world 
buyers frequently avoid such straightforward and potentially hos-
tile notice in an effort to amiably work through problems. 
Finally, it is important to note the overwhelming effect of a find-
ing that the buyer has failed to give adequate notice. There is no 
question that K & M experienced substantial problems with the 
TBM; the trial court awarded 1.5 million dollars in damages. Nev-
ertheless, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, finding that K & M 
followed a course of conduct which failed to inform Calweld it was 
claiming a breach of warranty, required that K & M be barred 
from any remedy. The defense of failure to give timely and ade-
quate notice when successfully used is devastating to a buyer. As a 
result, clients should be carefully counseled concerning the type of 
notice to give. An ounce of preventative counseling is better than a 
million dollar cure. 
B. The Reliance Requirement 
The case of Overstreet v. Norden Laboratories, Inc.46 presents 
the troublesome question of whether the element of reliance is nec-
essary in a breach of express warranty action. The plaintiff, Dr. 
Overstreet, is a practicing veterinarian, and operator of a standard 
bred horse farm in Kentucky. In the spring of 1973, two mares on 
the plaintiff's farm aborted their foals. It was determined that the 
abortions resulted from an equine rhinopneumonitis virus. The vi-
rus causes horses to exhibit symptoms which generally resemble a 
common cold, but will cause abortions in pregnant mares. 
The defendant, Norden Laboratories, manufactures and markets 
drugs to veterinarians. Among these drugs is Rhinomune, a vaccine 
designed to innoculate horses against equine rhinopneUmonitis. 
Rhinomune was first marketed by defendant in the spring of 1973, 
about the same time the plaintiff's mares aborted their foals. De-
fendant's marketing program for this new and unique drug, uti-
lized magazine advertisements, brochures and sales representa-
tives. One such representative called on Dr. Overstreet's office. 
46. 669 F.2d 1286 (6th Cir. 1982). 
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Being concerned about a possible epidemic among his breeding 
horses, plaintiff became interested in Rhinomune and allegedly 
read the defendant's promotional literature. Plaintiff asserts that 
representations contained in defendant's literature caused him to 
order a quantity of Rhinomune, which was then administered to a 
number of plaintiff's horses. Six of those innoculated aborted their 
foals. Plaintiff instituted an action to recover losses resulting from 
the aborted foals, alleging that the defendant breached expressed 
and implied warranties concerning its Rhinomune vaccine. 
The jury awarded plaintiff $40,500 in damages. The defendant 
appealed, charging as error the district court's failure to instruct 
that reliance is an element in a cause of action for breach of im-
plied47 and express48 warranties under the Uniform Commercial 
47. U.C.C. § 2-314 (1978) dealing with the implied warranty of merchantability provides: 
(1) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316), a warranty that the goods shall 
[d. 
be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant 
with respect to goods of that kind. Under this section the serving for value of food 
or drink to be consumed either on the permises or elsewhere is a sale. 
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as 
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract description; and 
(b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality within the 
description; and 
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used; and 
(d) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even kind, 
quality· and quantity within each unit and among all units involved; and 
(e) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agreement may 
require; and 
(0 conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the container or 
label if any. 
(3) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316) other implied warranties may 
arise from course of dealing or usage of trade. 
48. U.C.C. § 2-313 (1978) which defines express warranty provides in part: 
[d. 
(1) Express warranties by the seller are created as follows: 
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer which 
relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates an 
express warranty that the goods shall conform to the affirmation or 
promise. 
(b) Any description of the goods which is made part of the basis of the 
bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the 
description. 
(c) Any sample or model which is made part of the basis of the bargain 
creates an express warranty that the whole of the goods shall conform to 
the sample or model. 
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Code. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded for a new trial.49 
The court found that since the implied warranty of 
merchantability arises by operation of law, reliance is not required 
as an element of a buyer's cause of action. Accordingly, the trial 
judge properly instructed the jury on the implied warranty 
theory:lo 
It is undisputed that reliance is not an element of an implied 
warranty of merchantability action. III Unless effectively disclaimed, 
the implied warranty of merchantability attaches to the goods at 
the time of sale. 
The court's reversal was based upon resolution of the second is-
sue. Adopting the view that reliance is necessary in a breach of 
express warranty action, tbe court found that the jury instructions 
and verdict form were improper because neither required a finding 
of reliance as an element of recovery.lIl! 
Whether reliance is an element of a breach of express warranty 
action is less than clear. A review of federal and state court deci-
sions reveals a definite split of authority. The main reason for this 
split stems from the change from the Uniform Sales Act to the 
Uniform Commercial Code. Section 12 of the Uniform Sales Act 
provided that "[a]ny affirmation of fact or any promise by the 
seller relating to the goods is an express warranty if the natural 
tendency of such affirmation or promise is to induce the buyer to 
purchase the goods, and if the buyer purchases the goods relying 
thereon."113 Accordingly, under the Uniform Sales Act, in order to 
recover, the buyer was required to prove reliance on the warranty. 
The Code, on the other hand, omits any reference to reliance 
and substitutes a "basis of the bargain" requirement: 
(1) Express warranties by the seller are created as follows: 
(a) Any affirmation or fact or promise made by the seller to the 
buyer which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of 
the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall COD-
form to the affirmation or promise.M 
49. 669 F.2d at 1288-89. 
50. [d. at 1289. 
51. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 20, at 345. 
52. 669 F.2d at 1289. 
53. Uniform Sales Act § 12, 1 U.L.A. 6 (1906), repealed by V.C.C. § 2-313(1)(1978). 
54. U.C.C. § 2-313(1) (1978) (emphasis added). 
HeinOnline -- 1983 Det. C.L. Rev. 590 1983
590 Detroit College of Law Review [2:575 
The commentators do not agree as to the impact of this change. 
Some feel that the basis of the bargain requirement merely shifts 
the burden of proving non-reliance to the seller.1I11 The comments 
to U.C.C. section 2-313 seem to bear out this analysis: "[A]ll the 
statements of the seller [become part of the basis of the bargain] 
unless good reason is shown to the contrary. "116 
Some writers and courts find that the Code has eliminated the 
requirement of reliance altogether. The focus has changes from the 
buyer having to rely on the seller's specific statements, to the seller 
being forced to stand behind his words.1I7 Such a focus eliminates 
the reliance requirement and receives support in the Code 
comments.1I8 
Other commentators and courts indicate that the drafters did 
not intend to change the law, but that benefit of the bargain is 
essentially the same as reliance. liS Since "basis of the bargain" is 
not defined, courts employ the Uniform Sales Act test of whether 
the buyer relied on the affirmation or promise, perhaps due to the 
55. Ezer, The Impact of the Uniform Commercial Code on the California Law of Sales 
Warranties, 8 U.C.L.A. REv. 281, 285 (1961). The author notes: 
The Code's implicit premise is that buyer's reliance is prima facie established 
from the fact that he made the purchase. If the seller can establish that the buyer 
in fact did not rely on the seller, that the affirmation or promise was not the 
"basis of the bargain," to use the Code language, then there is no express 
warranty. 
Id. at 285 n. 30. 
56. U.C.C. § 2-313 comment 8 (1978). 
57. Under such an interpretation, the affirmation once made, is a part of the agreement, 
and lack of reliance by the buyer does not take the affirmation out of the agreement. Note, 
"Basis of the Bargain" - What Role Reliance?, 34 U. PITf. L. REv. 145, 151 (1972). See, e.g., 
Walker v. Woolbright Motors, Inc., 620 S.W.2d 451 (Mo. App. 1981); Collins Radio Co. of 
Dallas, Texas v. R.B. Bell, 623 P.2d 1039 (Okla. App. 1980); Viola Gladden v. Cadillac, 83 
N.J. 320, 416 A.2d 394 (1980); Marston v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., Inc., 448 F. Supp. 
172 (W.O. Va. 1978). 
58. U.C.C. § 2-313 comment 3 provides: 
In actual practice affirmations of fact made by the seller about the goods during a 
bargain are regarded as part of the description of those goods; hence no particular 
reliance on Buch statements need be shown in order to weave them into the fabric 
of the agreement. Rather, any fact which is to take such affirmations, once made, 
out of the agreement requires clear affirmative proof. The issue normally is one of 
fact. (emphasis added). 
"[TJhe whole purpose of the law of warranty is to determine what it is that t.he seller has in 
essence agreed to sell." U.C.C. § 2-313 comment 4 illustrates that the emphasis is being 
shifted from buyer to seller. 
59. 1 N.Y. State Law Revision Comm'n, 392-93 (1955); Note, The Uniform Commercial 
Code and Greater Consumer Protection Under Warranty Law, 49 Ky. L. J. 240, 243 (1960). 
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lack of any other meaningful standard.80 
The Sixth Circuit, in the instant case, relied upon the commen-
tator's analysis in the Kentucky annotated statutes in holding that 
"[a] warranty is the basis of the bargain if it has been relied upon 
as one of the inducements for purchasing the product."81 Since it is 
possible that the Code drafters did not intend to change the law, 
the court's holding is not unreasonable.82 However, the Sixth Cir-
cuit is adopting a strict standard which requires the buyer to prove 
reliance in fact on the seller's affirmation which became a basis of 
the bargain. Under the more liberal standard applied in other ju-
risdictions, it appears that the buyer need only establish 
knowledge of the seller's affirmations.8s 
At a minimum, basis of the bargain was probably intended to be 
a softer version of reliance. A buyer should at least believe in the 
representations of the seller in order to recover on an express war-
ranty theory. In light of the differing standards employed by vari-
ous jurisdictions, however, the careful practitioner should allege, 
and offer to prove, some reliance. 
C. Good Faith and Termination at Will 
The question of whether the U.C.C. implied good faith term can 
override a termination at will clause, expressly stated in the con-
tract of the parties, is presented in Cardinal Stone Co., Inc. v. Ri-
60. See, e.g., Hagenbuch v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 339 F. Supp. 676 (D.N.H. 1972); Speed 
Fastners, Inc. v. Newsom, 382 F.2d 395 (10th Cir. 1967); Stamm v. Wilder Travel Trailers, 
44 Ill. App. 3d 530, 358 N.E.2d 382 (1976). 
61. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 355 2-313(1)(a), comment l(c) (Baldwin 1958). This comment 
states: 
[d. 
Materiality of Affirmation, Promise, Description, Sample. Under the Code, the 
qualification that affirmations, etc. create a warranty if made "as the basis of' the 
bargain, appears to be substantially the same as the "reliance" qualification in § 
12 of the Uniform Sales Act, former KRS 361.120. Van Deren Hardware Co. v. 
Preston, 242 Ky. 170,5 S.W.2d 1052 (1928) .. 
62. Commentators White and Summers favor the interpretation that the exchange of the 
basis of the bargain language for the old reliance language will not change the outcome of 
the cases. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 20, at 335 n.35. They argue that a buyer who has 
not relied upon the seller's statement should not have a right to sue but should be relegated 
to a breach of implied warranty action. [d. at 338-39. 
63. Interco, Inc. v. Randustrial Corp., 533 S.W.2d 257 (Mo. App. 1976). That case in-
volved express warranties in a seller's catalogue and the court held that the buyer had to at 
least read the catalogue in order for it to become a part of the basis of the bargain. Id. at 
262. 
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val Manufacturing CO.64 In that case, Cardinal, a ceramics firm, 
supplied Rival with the primary component of their slow cookers. 
These internal cooking shells were purchased by Rival under 
twenty-two purchase orders which spanned a six-year period. Rival 
cancelled the last eight orders pursuant to the contract's termina-
tion clause. The termination clause, which appeared in the stan-
dardized purchase order, gave Rival the power to terminate the 
contract at any time.611 The clause did not contain a notice 
requirement. 
Cardinal brought suit, arguing that the V.C.C. imposed a good 
faith term upon the parties' agreement66 and that an arbitrary ter-
mination must be equated with acting in bad faith. This, according 
to Cardinal, prevented Rival from terminating the orders. The dis-
trict court granted Rival's motion for summary judgment, holding 
as a matter of law, that the termination at will clause, an express 
term of the contract, was not overridden by the V.C.C. obligation 
to deal in good faith. 67 
The Sixth Circuit affirmed in a per curiam opinion. Relying on 
Corenswet v. Amana Refrigeration, Inc.,6s the court refused to al-
low the good faith requirement to control an express power of ter-
mination. Agreeing with the Fifth Circuit, the court held that ter-
mination provisions and real economic overreaching should be 
analyzed under the unconscionability provision69 of the V.C.C. 
rather than the good faith provision. After impliedly analyzing the 
Cardinal-Rival relationship under the unconscionability provision, 
the court found that Cardinal was not the victim of economic over-
64. 669 F.2d 395 (6th Cir. 1982). 
65. The termination clause read: "Buyer reserves the right to change or amend the speci· 
fications and to terminate this purchase order in whole or in part at any time." [d. at 396. 
66. See U.C.C. § 1·203. 
67. 669 F.2d at 396. 
68. 594 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1979). In the Corenswet case, an exclusive distributor of home 
appliances brought suit against the manufacturer to prevent termination of the business 
relationship. A provision of the contract permitted termination by either party, at any time, 
for any reason, on ten days' notice. [d. at 132. The Fifth Circuit held: Amana's desire to 
give the distributorship to another company constituted a sufficient reason to terminate (Id. 
at 135). The express term could not be overridden by the conduct of the parties as course of 
dealing, even though Amana's conduct may have created a reasonable expectation that the 
distributorship would not be terminated arbitrarily (Id. at 136). Unlike the U.C.C.'s uncon· 
scionability provision, the Code's general obljgation of good faith dealing cannot properly be 
used to strike down unfair contract terms (Id. at 139). 
69. See U.C.C. § 2-302. 
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reaching or sharp business practices.70 Cardinal could not complain 
of Rival's exercise of a right which Cardinal had expressly 
relinq uished. 
The question of whether an arbitrary termination of a contract 
relationship contravenes the V.C.C.'s general obligation of good 
faith has not been uniformly decided. Commentators have debated 
the utility of imposing a good faith standard on a termination at 
will clause.71 Case law on the question has split into three camps. 
Some courts read a good faith limitation into a termination 
clause.72 Other courts hold that terminable at will contracts are 
terminable with or without cause.73 A thjrd group of courts take 
the position that contracts may be terminated without cause but 
only upon reasonable notice.7• V.C.C. section 2-309(3) provides au-
thority for requiring reasonable notice: "Termination of a contract 
by one party except on the happening of an agreed event requires 
that reasonable notification be received by the other party and an 
agreement dispensing with notification is invalid if its operation 
would be unconscionable."711 
In the instant case, the court does not discuss what, if any, no-
tice of termination was given by Rival. The court does, however, 
point out that Cardinal was cognizant that the consumer demand 
70. 669 F.2d at 396. 
71. Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and Commercial Reasonableness Under the 
Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. CHI. L. REv. 666 (1963); Gellhom, Limitations on Con-
tract Termination Rights-Franchise Cancellations, 1967 DUKE L. J. 465; Hewitt, Good 
Faith or Unconscionability-Franchise Remedies for Termination, 29 Bus. LAW 227 (1973). 
72. Baker v. Ratzlaff, 1 Kan. App. 2d 285, 564 P.2d 153 (1976); Tele-Controls, Inc. v. 
Ford Industries, Inc., 388 F.2d 48 (7th Cir. 1967); de Treville v. Outboard Marine Corp., 439 
F.2d 1099 (4th Cir. 1971); Randolph v. New England Mutual Life Ins. Co., 526 F.2d 1383 
(6th Cir. 1975); Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Razumic, 480 Pa. 366, 390 A.2d 736 (1978); Ashland 
Oil, Inc. v. Donahue, 18 U.C.C. 1129 (W.V.S. Ct. App. 1976); Zapatha v. Dairy Mart, Inc., 
408 N.E.2d 1370 (Mass. 1980). 
73. Sinkoff Beverage Co., Inc. v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 273 N.Y.S.2d 364 (1966). 
While many cases state that terminable at will contracts can be terminated with or without 
cause, they almost always require reasonable notice. See infra note 74. 
74. Rockwell Engineering Co., Inc. v. Automatic Timing & Controls Co., 559 F.2d 460 
(7th Cir. 1977); Aaron E. Levine & Co. v. Calkraft Paper Co., 429 F. Supp. 1039 (E. D. Mich. 
1976); Des Moines Blue Ribbon Dist., Inc. v. Drewrys Limited, U.S.A., Inc., 256 Iowa 899, 
129 N.W.2d 731 (1964); Universal Lite Dist., Inc. v. Northwest Ind., Inc., 602 F.2d 1173 (4th 
Cir. 1979); Hamilton Tailoring Co. v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 14 U.C.C. 1310 (D.C.S.D. Ohio 
1974); Apache Trailer Sales v. Redman Ind., Inc., 22 U.C.C. 1089 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977); 
Reisman and Sons v. Snyder's Potato Chips, 20 U.C.C. 856 (Pa. 1976); McGinnis Piano & 
Organ Co. v. Yamaha International Corp., 480 F.2d 474 (8th Cir. 1973). 
75. U.C.C. § 2-309(3). 
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for Rival's product was disappearing.18 This knowledge could po-
tentially negate any requirement of formal notification prior to 
termination. 
Profesor Gellhorn observed that the good faith approach is ana-
lytically unsound because there is no correlation between bad mo-
tives and unfair terminations.11 While it is true that good faith 
generally appears absent in an arbitrary termination situation, the 
question remains whether the unconscionability provision of 
V.C.C. section 2-302 is a satisfactory policing devise.18 
From a counseling standpoint, it appears that at a minimum, cli-
ents should be advised to give reasonable notification of so-called 
arbitrary termination. Reasonable notification would negate any 
alleged bad motives, while complying with the requirement of 
V.C.C. section 2-309(3).18 It appears unlikely that the good faith 
requirement was intended to prevent termination of contractual 
relationships where the relationship of the parties has soured,80 or 
where the contractual relationship is no longer necessary because 
of a dramatic decline in demand for the product.81 
III. SECURED TRANSACTIONS 
A. Purchase Money Versus Purchase Money 
In United States v. Cahall Brothers,82 a lender and a seller 
claimed priority as to the proceeds from the sale of repossessed 
farm equipment purchased by the debtors, the Lacys. The Vnited 
States (hereinafter referred to as FHA) appealed from the district 
76. 669 F.2d at 396. 
77. Gelhorn, supra note 71, at 521. 
78. The court's power to strike down unconscionable contract clauses is directed against 
one-sided, oppressive and unfairly surprising contracts. "The basic test is whether, in light 
of the general commercial background and the commercial needs of the particular trade or 
case, the clauses involved are so one-sided as to be unconscionable under the circumstances 
existing at the time of the making. of the contract." U.C.C. § 2-302 comment 1. Accordingly, 
it is doubtful that termination clauses in commercial contracts will be struck down as having 
been unconscionable at the time the contract was made. In the instant case, the court held 
that Cardinal was not a victim of economic overreaching, thereby, impliedly holding that 
the termination clause was not unconscionable. 
79. At least one jurisdiction has followed this approach. See Superior Foods, Inc. v. Har-
ris Teeter Super Markets, 288 N.C. 213, 217 S.E.2d 566 (1975). 
SO. 594 F.2d at 138. 
81. 669 F.2d at 396. 
82. 674 F.2d 578 (6th Cir. 1982). 
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court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the seller. 
On September 23, 1971, FHA approved a loan in the amount of 
$22,800 to the Lacys who agreed to use the money to purchase 
farm equipment. FHA filed a financing statement on December 13, 
1971. FHA disbursed part of the loan ($13,600) on January 4, 1972. 
On January 10, 1972, FHA entered into a security agreement with 
the debtors. Then, on March 2, 1972, FHA disbursed the remain-
der of the funds ($9,280). All of this money was placed in a special 
account to which FHA had access. On April 11, 1972, a check was 
written for the purchase of farm equipment, which was cosigned by 
FHA and the Lacys. The check indicated that it was for the 
purchase of four pieces of farm equipment. On the date of issu-
ance, a second security agreement was entered into between the 
Lacys and FHA. The next day the debtors used the check as a 
down payment on the purchase of four pieces of farm equipment 
and a tractor. The seller, Cahall, entered into a security agreement 
with the debtors using the five pieces of farm equipment as collat-
eral, creating a purchase money security interest in the seller. Ca-
hall perfected this interest by filing a financing statement on April 
19, within ten days after the debtor received possession of the 
collateral. 
The issue presented is whether FHA was also a purchase money 
secured party. Unable to decide the question in the absence of a 
complete record, the Sixth Circuit remanded the case to the dis-
trict court to review the nature of the agreement under the super-
vised account to determine when value was given by the FHA.83 
The court held that, if, by the later disbursement, value was given, 
the FHA would be a purchase money lender and that purchase 
money status would give FHA priority over the purchase money 
seller since FHA was the first to file.8• In arriving at this result, the 
court applied the general priority rule of U.C.C. section 9-312(5) to 
the competing purchase money security interests.811 Whether this 
general priority rule of first-to-file should apply to competing 
purchase money security interests is not resolved by either the 
statute, the commentators or the courts. 
In order to understand the problem, one need first examine the 
83. Id. at 582. 
84. Id. at 581. 
85. Id. 
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special priority rule established for purchase money security inter-
ests in collateral other than inventory. Section 9-312(4) provides: 
"A purchase money security interest in collateral other than inven-
tory has priority over a conflicting security interest in the same 
collateral or its proceeds if the purchase money security interest is 
perfected at the time the debtor receives possession of the collat-
eral or within ten days thereafter." 
If, on remand, FHA is established as a purchase money secured 
party, both FHA and Cahall technically qualify for the special pri-
ority of V.C.C. section 9-312(4). The collateral, however, is insuffi-
cient to satisfy both claims. Accordingly, the question becomes 
which purchase money party should be given priority. Since no an-
swer is given in the special priority rule of V.C.C. section 9-312(4), 
resolution is frequently sought in the general priority rule of 
V.C.C. section 9-312(5): 
In all other cases not governed by other rules stated in this section (in-
cluding cases of purchase money security interests which do not qualify 
for the special priorities set forth in subsections (3) and (4) of this sec-
tion), priority between conflicting security interest in the same collateral 
shall be determined according to the following rules: 
(a) Conflicting security interests rank according to priority in time 
of filing or perfection: Priority dates from the time a filing is first 
made covering the collateral or the time the security interest is first 
perfected, whichever is earlier, provided that there is no period 
thereafter when there is neither filing nor perfection. 
(b) So long as conflicting security interests are unperfected, the 
first to attach has priority.se 
While this section has been relied upon to give priority to the first 
of the purchase money parties to perfect or file,8'1 the italicized lan-
guage in V.C.C. section 9-312(5) has been interpreted as excluding 
the case where two purchase money parties qualify for priority 
under V.C.C. section 9-312(4).88 
As alternatives to applying the general priority rule of V.C.C. 
86. v.c.c. § 9-312(5) (emphasis added). 
87. White & Summers approve of the Court's decision in this case to apply the first to 
file or perfect rule of v.c.c. §9-312(5) and award priority accordingly. WHITE & SUMMERS, 
supra note 20, at 1051-52. 
88. For two such interpretations, see, ELDEN REILY, GUIDEBOOK TO SECURITY INTERESTS 
IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 16-17 (1981)" and IB SECURED TRANSACTIONS VNDER THE V.C.C., 
(MB), § 19.02(3)[a], at 1980. 
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section 9-312(5) to conflicting purchase money parties, at least 
three solutions have been posed. One approach, in looking outside 
the Code, is to give preference to a purchase money seller over a 
purchase money lender.89 Early conditional sales cases, where the 
seller retained title to the property, support this approach.90 
A second solution is to give priority to the first purchase money 
party to extend value. This solution would usually result in the 
purchase money lender, who advances the down payment, being 
given priority over the purchase money seller.91 
The final approach, favored by this author, is t~ have the 
purchase money secured parties share pro rata. Pro rata sharing 
has been rationalized on the basis that section 9-312(5) does not 
apply when both parties qualify under section 9-312(4). Since sec-
tion 9-312(4) governs, but does not yield a priority rule, the priori-
ties must be equal and there should be a pro rata distribution of 
the collateral or its proceeds.92 Viewed as a more reasonable alter-
native to the first-to-file rule, pro rata sharing has been analogized 
to section 9-315(2), in that each purchase money security interest 
would rank equally according to· the proportion of the purchase 
price advanced.s3 Finally, it has been suggested that an earlier 
draft of the Code promoted pro rata sharing between two conflict-
ing purchase money security interests.9• Although a pro rata shar-
ing raises questions of application,911 it appears to be an equitable 
89. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 741 (1965). 
90. Hunter v. Scruggs Drug Store, Inc., 113 F.2d 971 (4th Cir. 1940). For a case decided 
under the U.C.C. with similar rationale, see Framingham U.A.W. Credit Union v. Dick Rus-
sell Pontiac, Inc., 7 U.C.C. 252 (Mass. App. Div. 1969). 
91. The first to file or perfect rule of U.C.C. § 9-312(5) would also yield this result as the 
purchase money lender usually has the first contact with the debtor and, accordingly, files 
first. 
92. Reily, supra note 88, at 17. 
93. HENSON, SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 128 (1979). 
94. IB SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE U.C.C. (MB) § 19.02 [3](a), at 1980. Section 
9-312(5) of the 1952 draft provided: 
When there are conflicting purchase-money security interests, the interest of a 
·seller or of a secured party whose advance was used at his direction to pay a seller 
takes priority if he has perfected his interest at the time the debtor receives the 
collateral or within ten days thereafter. In any other case of conflicting purchase 
money security interests they rank equally. 
U.C.C. § 9-312(5) text and comments edition (Official Draft 1952) (emphasis added). 
95. One commentator queries: "Should the pro rata allocation be based on the original 
amount of the debt, the balance due at the time of default or some other formula? How 
should finance charges and collection costs be cranked into the pro rata formula?" Reiley, 
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solution to one of the Code's unresolved issues. 
B. Goods Subject to Certificates of Title 
Two cases from the survey period address the question of 
whether notation of a security interest on a certificate of title, is-
sued by a foreign jurisdiction, constitutes perfection only if the for-
eign jurisdiction is the debtor's chief place of business. 
In the first case, In re Paige," the debtor was a Michigan resi-
dent who purchased a truck tractor in Indiana. Pursuant to a se-
curity agreement, the Indiana seller received a purchase money se-
curity interest in the tractor. The debtor was an interstate hauler 
for Overland Express, which had a business office in Chicago, Illi-
nois.97 An application for an Illinois certificate of title was com-
pleted, reciting the Overland Express business office as the 
debtor's legal address. The State of Illinois issued a certificate of 
title to the vehicle which reflected the security interest of the 
seller's assignee. Neither an application for a Michigan title nor a 
financing statement was ever filed. 
The second case, In re Angier,98 is decided on the basis of the 
holding in the Paige case. The facts of the two cases are quite simi-
lar. In the Angier case, the debtor, a Michigan resident, purchased 
a truck tractor in Michigan. The debtor executed a financing state-
ment and a security agreement and the purchase money seller's 
assignee, White Motor Credit, filed the financing statement locally. 
The debtor worked under a lease agreement with Ace-Doran 
Trucking Company, a multi-state concern with home offices in 
Cincinnati, Ohio. Since the debtor had an Ohio tax-exempt num-
ber, he titled the truck in Ohio to avoid paying Michigan sales tax. 
He did, however, file an "Application for Michigan Title" and a 
"Michigan In-Transit Registration," which indicated his intent to 
title the truck in Ohio. An Ohio certificate of title listed Ace-Do-
ran's terminal in Perrysburg, Ohio, as the debtor's address. Both 
the Michigan In-Transit Registration and the Ohio title reflected 
supra note 51, at 16-17. 
96. 679 F.2d 601 (6th Cir. 1982). 
97. Overland Express' terminal was in Northern Indiana and ita home office was in Min-
nesota. [d. 
98. 684 F.2d 397 (1982). 
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the security interest in the truck.99 Both the Paige and Angier 
debtors went into bankruptcy. 
In both cases, the bankruptcy court ruled that the security inter-
ests indicated on the Illinois and Ohio certificates of title were un-
perfected under Michigan law, and therefore, subordinate to liens 
of the bankrupts' trustees.I°o Citing a previous decision/o1 the 
bankruptcy judge held that, under the 1962 version of V.C.C. sec-
tion 9-103, a security interest noted on a foreign jurisdiction's cer-
tificate of title constitutes perfection only if the foreign jurisdiction 
was the bankrupt-debtor's chief place of business.102 Since both 
bankrupts were Michigan residents doing business in Michigan, 
the Illinois and Ohio certificates of title did not perfect the secur-
ity interests in the trucks. 
This decision results from reading together the requirements of 
two subsections of V.C.C. section 9-103 which are arguably mutu-
ally exclusive. Section 9-103(2), dealing with mobile goods provides 
in relevant part: 
If the chief place of business of a debtor is in this state, this article gov-
erns the validity and perfection of a security interest and the possibility 
and effect of proper filing with regard to general intangibles or with re-
gard to goods of a type which are normally used in more than one juris-
diction (such as automotive equipment, rolling stock, airplanes, road 
building equipment, commercial harvesting equipment, construction ma-
chinery and the like) if such goods are classified as equipment or classi-
fied as inventory by reason of their being leased by the debtor to others. 
Read in isolation, this section appears to be applicable to the truck 
tractors, which are normally used in more than one jurisdiction 
and are classified as equipment. 
However, subsection 4 to V.C.C. section 9-103 may be read as 
prohibiting application of subsection 2, in a case where the collat-
eral is personal property covered by a certificate of title provision: 
Notwithstanding subsections (2) and (3), if personal property is covered 
by a certificate of title issued under a statute of this state or any other 
jurisdiction which requires indication on a certificate of title of any se-
curity interest in the property as a condition of perfection, then the 
perfection is governed by the law of the jurisdiction which issued the 
99. [d. at 399. 
100. The pertinent code section is U.C.C. § 9-301. 
101. In Re Brown. 5 V.C.C. 401 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1968). 
102. 684 F.2d at 399. 
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certificate. 
In reversing the lower courts, the Sixth Circuit established in the 
Paige case and reiterated in the Angier case that only U.C.C. sec-
tion 9-103(4) must be complied with to perfect a security interest 
in personal property covered by certificate of title provisions. The 
court held that this literal interpretation of U.C.C. section 9-103(4) 
accomplishes the underlying notice policy of the Code. l03 A poten-
tial creditor need only look to the certificate of title to discover 
prior security interests. 
The Sixth Circuit holdings are amply supported. First, use of the 
word "notwithstanding" in the 1962 version of U.C.C. section 9-
103(4) indicates that the subsection takes priority over subsection 
(2) when a certificate of title has been issued. l04 Additionally, the 
amended language of the 1972 Code section clearly provides that 
mobile goods and goods covered by certificates of title are to be 
accorded different treatment under the mutually exclusive provi-
sions of U.C.C. section 9-103. The 1972 provision covering mobile 
goods states: "This subsection applies . . . to goods which are mo-
bile and which are of a type normally used in more than one juris-
diction ... if the goods are equipment or are inventory based or 
held for lease by the debtor to others, and are not covered by a 
certificate of title described in subsection (2). "106 
Furthermore, an underlying policy of mutual exclusivity can be 
found in Article 9 when classifying collateral. lOS Finally, the 1968 
case upon which the bankruptcy judge based his deCisions in the 
instant cases has been criticized both as to its statutory interpreta-
tion and its rationale. 107 
103. Id. 
104. See In re Dawson, 21 U.C.C. 293 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1976). 
105. U.C.C. § 9-103(3) (1972) (emphasis added). 
106. U.C.C. § 9-109 comment 2 provides: "The classes of goods are mutually exclusive; 
the same property cannot at the same time and as to the same person be both equipment 
and inventory, for example." Id. 
107. In re Brown, 5 U.C.C. 401 (Bankr. W.O. Mich. 1968), is reviewed in HENSON, SE-
CURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 334-43 (1979), as follows: 
Apparently the referee's reasoning was that the Code's provisions for perfection 
were designed to give notice and a certificate issued in Indiana would not do so. 
To the extent that this was the basis for the holding, it does not survive examina-
tion because a person looking at a certificate of title is equally informed of noted 
liens regardless of which state issued the certificate, and nothing could be less 
material in fact in a bankruptcy proceeding where the trustee has relied on noth-
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Id. 
ing. The referee felt that perfection had to be in the proper state under Sections 
9-103(2) and (3), and that this debtor's chief place of business was in Michigan 
rather than Indiana, which is immaterial for certificated vehicles under (4). 
601 
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